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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that state-of-the-art deep
learning models are vulnerable to the inputs with
small perturbations (adversarial examples). We ob-
serve two critical obstacles in adversarial examples:
(i) Strong adversarial attacks (e.g., C&W attack) re-
quire manually tuning hyper-parameters and take a
long time to construct an adversarial example, mak-
ing it impractical to attack real-time systems; (ii)
Most of the studies focus on non-sequential tasks,
such as image classification, yet only a few consider
sequential tasks. In this work, we speed up adversar-
ial attacks, especially on sequential learning tasks.
By leveraging the uncertainty of each task, we di-
rectly learn the adaptive multi-task weightings, with-
out manually searching hyper-parameters. A unified
architecture is developed and evaluated for both non-
sequential tasks and sequential ones. To validate the
effectiveness, we take the scene text recognition task
as a case study. To our best knowledge, our proposed
method is the first attempt to adversarial attack for
scene text recognition. Adaptive Attack achieves over
99.9% success rate with 3 ∼ 6× speedup compared
to state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Recent studies [6,10,34] have shown that deep neural
networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, by
adding imperceptible perturbations on original im-
ages to fool a deep learning model. Adversarial exam-
ples have raised significant concerns since deep learn-
ing models are prevalent in many security-critical sys-
tems.
Accelerating Adversarial Attacks: Attacking
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Figure 1: `2 distance in the Attack Process:
We attack an ImageNet example using three meth-
ods: original C&W attack, modified C&W attack,
and our proposed Adaptive Attack and report the `2
distance of the perturbation in the attack process.
Adaptive Attack achieves a small perturbation much
faster than C&W attacks.
deep learning models is time-limited in many real-
world systems (e.g., autonomous driving, face recog-
nition). In the recent NIPS 2018 Adversarial Vi-
sion Challenge, each attack is requested to “pro-
cess a batch of 10 images within 900s on a K80
GPU” [4]. Many strong iterative optimization-based
attacks [2, 6, 23] generate adversarial examples of
high-quality and hard to be defended [2,5], but these
iterative methods usually take a longer time to find
proper weights/hyper-parameters for optimization,
which becomes an obstacle to attacking real-time sys-
tems. For instance, it takes about one hour to gener-
ate a piece of adversarial audio with a few seconds [7].
Also, accelerating adversarial attacks is a critical
and non-trivial task for adversarial defenses. Adver-
sarial Training, adding adversarial examples to the
training set, has been shown the most promising so-
lution to defend adversarial attacks [2]. However,
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
03
32
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
1 M
ar 
20
19
Figure 2: An adversarial example of scene text
recognition. First row: an original image (‘IM-
PORTED’) from the IC13 dataset. Second row: ad-
versarial perturbations added on the original image.
Third row: the adversarial image, incorrectly pre-
dicted as ‘BUSINESS’. Humans can barely recognize
the difference between the two images. Red lines de-
note the CTC alignments.
it is time-consuming to generate adversarial exam-
ples for training using current iterative optimization-
based attacks. To reduce attacking time, [26] trained
with adversarial examples generated from C&W at-
tack only in the first epoch, and then adopted FGSM,
a faster one-step attack but with a degraded perfor-
mance on perturbations, for the rest of training.
In this paper, we propose an Adaptive Attack to
accelerate adversarial attacking, inspired by recent
findings in multi-task learning. Generating adver-
sarial examples is inherently a multi-task optimiza-
tion problem, where we try to make an impercep-
tible change on the original samples while making
the deep learning model to predict incorrectly. For
classification tasks, we usually minimize distances
between original examples and adversarial examples
while minimizing the classification loss (e.g., cross-
entropy loss, CTC loss [11]) of adversarial examples
on targeted labels.
Previous attacks simultaneously optimize two ob-
jectives, by using a naïve weighted sum of multi-task
losses. The weights of losses usually are uniformly de-
fined [23] or manually tuned [6]. For example, C&W
attack [6] is a commonly-used attack which applies
a modified binary search to find a proper weight in
the attack. However, the optimal weights between
two tasks are strongly dependent on tasks (e.g., im-
age distance vs. audio distance, cross-entropy loss
vs. CTC loss). Researchers and practitioners have
to carefully choose appropriate weights between task
losses to achieve a good performance. Therefore, it is
desirable to find a better approach to learn the optimal
weights automatically.
Multi-task learning is widely studied in many ma-
chine learning tasks, where they aim to improve
learning efficiency and prediction accuracy by learn-
ing multiple objectives from a shared representa-
tion [21]. Recently, Kendall et al. proposed a prin-
cipled approach for multi-task weightings, by com-
bining observation (aleatoric) uncertainty and model
(epistemic) uncertainty. They modeled each task in
a unified Bayesian deep learning framework [20, 21]
and outperformed the separately trained models for
semantic segmentation, instance segmentation, and
depth regression. Their solution is limited to non-
sequential learning tasks (such as image classification,
image segmentation), which might not directly apply
to adversarial attacks on sequential learning tasks.
In Section 3.3, we extend this idea and further derive
a novel approximate solution to sequential learning
tasks.
Adversarial attack on non-sequential learn-
ing: Similar to [21], we assume that two tasks in
adversarial attacks (minimizing the classification loss
and adversarial perturbations) follow probabilistic
models. Our task is reformulated as attacking non-
sequential classification problem by adaptively bal-
ancing tasks and tuning the weights. We refer to our
proposed method as Adaptive Attack. Figure 1 illus-
trates that Adaptive Attack achieves a small adver-
sarial perturbation much faster compared with strong
and commonly-used attacks, C&W attack [5] for an
image recognition task (See Section 4.1 for details).
Adversarial attack on sequential learning:
Current studies on adversarial examples mainly fo-
cus on non-sequential adversarial classification prob-
lems, such as image classification [10,34], face recog-
nition [29], reinforcement learning [22], and seman-
tic segmentation [13]. Only very few targets at se-
quential learning tasks, such as speech-to-text [7]
and reading comprehension [18], not to mention the
analysis of sequential adversarial examples. Applying
Adaptive Attack to sequential learning tasks is non-
trivial, due to the specific objective function and se-
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quential properties.
Take adversarial attacks on text recognition tasks
as an example. The differences between non-
sequential and sequential adversarial examples in-
volve: (i) The output of a sequential model is a
varied-length label, instead of a single label. The
non-sequential attacks (such as object classification
model) only involve the substitution operation (e.g.,
modify the original class label), while the sequential
attacks consider three operations: insertion, substi-
tution, and deletion (e.g., insertion: coat → coats,
substitution: coat → cost, deletion: coat → cot).
(ii) Each character in target labels needs well-aligned.
The requirement of the alignment between input and
output poses a challenge on generating adversarial ex-
amples. (iii) Sequential models usually leverage re-
current neural networks, where the internal feature
representation involves more sequential context than
those in convolutional neural networks.
Inspired by these observations, we conduct attacks
on scene text recognition tasks. The scene text recog-
nition is naturally a sequential learning task, which
is closely related to standard classification tasks in
computer vision. Measuring hidden features in the
object classification task or speech recognition task
is difficult, with more uncertainty on model inter-
pretability. Adversarial attacks by modifying each
character in the text image will give us more intu-
itive explanations of how the perturbations affect the
final output.
1.1 Contributions
We propose a novel Adaptive Attack that di-
rectly learns multi-task weightings without manually
searching hyper-parameters, different from all previ-
ous adversarial attacks. Adaptive Attack is a general
method which can be applied to the current iterative
optimization-based attacks for both non-sequential
and sequential tasks. Especially for the scene text
recognition attack, Adaptive Attack accelerates ad-
versarial attacking by three to six times. Also, we
successfully attack a scene text recognition system
with over 99.9% success rate. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first work to generate adversarial
examples on a scene text recognition system.
2 Background
2.1 Scene Text Recognition
Scene text recognition tasks aim at decoding a
sequence of text characters from a cropped but
variable-length word image.
Recent scene text recognition approaches focus on
mapping the entire image to a word string, either
with hand-crafted features or deep learning features.
[1] proposed a subspace regression method to jointly
embed both word images and their text strings into
a common subspace, resulting in solving a nearest
neighbor problem. [16] developed a CNN model to
cast the word recognition into a multi-class classi-
fication problem. They further proposed a CNN
based architecture, incorporating a conditional ran-
dom field graphical model for unconstrained text
recognition [15]. [32] built an RNN with HOG fea-
tures and casted text recognition as a sequence label-
ing problem. [12] and [30] extracted rich visual fea-
tures from a CNN; then a sequence labeling is carried
out with LSTM and CTC. [24] incorporated attention
modeling into recursive recurrent neural networks for
lexicon-free optical character recognition in natural
scene images. [31] and [36] extended the work of [17]
to transform a distorted text region into a canonical
pose suitable for recognition. In our experiment, we
train a similar recognition model, based on the state-
of-the-art approach, Convolutional Recurrent Neural
Network (CRNN) [30].
2.2 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are imperceptible to human
but can easily fool deep neural networks in the test-
ing/deploying stage. People have studied adversarial
examples of machine learning models (machine learn-
ing evasion attacks) since 2012 [3].
The vulnerability to adversarial examples becomes
one of the major obstacles for applying deep neural
networks in many safety-critical scenarios. Most ex-
isting studies on adversarial examples focus on com-
puter vision related tasks: image classification [34],
face recognition [29], reinforcement learning [14], and
semantic segmentation [13]. Only a few studies have
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been devoted to sequential domains, such as speech
recognition [7] and reading comprehension [18].
Iterative attacks have been prevalent in adversarial
attacks due to high success rates and small pertur-
bations: iteratively searching and updating the per-
turbations based on the gradient of the output of the
victim model. In contrast, one-time attacks update
the adversarial perturbations only once and they are
usually used in real-time systems. For example, [14]
and [22] leveraged a one-time attack, Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [10], to attack reinforcement
learning systems due to the requirement of quick re-
sponse to the real-time input. However, it is easy to
detect/defend one-time attacks.
The magnitude of perturbations is measured by `p
norm (p = 0, 1,∞). A few studies use other measure-
ments (e.g., SSIM [28], spatial transformation [9]). In
this paper, we only consider `2 norm, which can be
comparable to most of the current work.
To our best knowledge, we are the first group to
successfully generate sequential adversarial examples
on a scene text recognition task.
3 Adaptive Adversarial Attack
In this section, we present details on our proposed
Adaptive Attack approach, which is inspired by re-
cent findings in multi-task learning. The multi-task
learning concerns the problem of optimizing a model
with respect to multiple objectives [21]. The naive
approach would be a linear combination of the losses
for each task:
L =
∑
i
λiLi. (1)
However, the model performance is extremely sen-
sitive to weight selection, λi. It is also costly to
tune these weight hyper-parameters manually. In
Bayesian modeling, we model these weight hyper-
parameters using task-dependent uncertainty (ho-
moscedastic uncertainty), which captures the rela-
tive important confidence between tasks, reflecting
the uncertainty inherent to our multiple objectives.
Adaptive Attack treats each task as a Gaussian distri-
bution, where the mean is given by the model output,
with an observation noise scalar σ. We will show how
to relate σ to the relative weight of each loss. Our
proposed Adaptive Attack generates adversarial ex-
amples on both non-sequential and sequential classi-
fication tasks, which generalizes the idea of [21].
3.1 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary has access to the scene
text recognition system, including the architecture
and parameters of the recognition model. This type
of attack is referred to as “White-Box Attack.” We
do not consider the “Black-Box Attack” in this pa-
per, which assumes the adversary has no access to the
trained neural network model. Prior work has shown
that adversarial examples generated by “White-Box
Attack” can be transferred to attack black-box ser-
vices due to the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples [27]. Approximating the gradients [8] is another
option for “Black-Box Attack.”
3.2 Basic Attack
Give an input image x, the ground-truth sequential
label l = {l0, l1, · · · , lT }, a targeted sequential label
l′ = {l′0, l′1, · · · , l′T ′} (l 6= l′), and a scene text recog-
nition model F , generating adversarial examples can
be defined as the following optimization problem:
minimize
x′
D(x, x′)
s.t. F(x′) = l′,
F(x) = l,
x′ ∈ [−1, 1]n,
(2)
where x′ is the modified adversarial image. x′ ∈
[−1, 1]n ensures a valid input of x′. D(·) denotes the
distance between the original image and the adver-
sarial image.
Following C&W Attack [6], we transform the func-
tion F to a differentiable function, CTCLoss. To re-
move the constraint of validation on new input x′,
we introduce a new variable w to replace x′, where
x′ = tanh(w). The new optimization problem is
given by:
minimize
x′
CTCLoss(tanh(w), l
′) + λD(x, tanh(w)),
(3)
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where CTCLoss(·, ·) denotes the CTC loss of the clas-
sifier F . λ is a task and data dependent hyper-
parameter to balance the importance of being adver-
sarial and close to the original image. People usually
search for a proper λ uniformly (log scale). In the
experiment, we follow a modified binary search be-
tween λ = 0.01 and λ = 1000, starting from λ = 0.1.
For each λ, we run 2,000 iterations of gradient de-
scent searching using Adam. We adopt an early-stop
strategy to avoid unnecessary computation.
3.3 Adaptive Attack
It is time-consuming to search for λ manually and
find an optimal parameter λ since λ largely de-
pends on individual tasks. In our experiment (Sec-
tion 4.2.1), we compare the performance of Basic At-
tack with fixed λ values, regarding the success rate
of attacks, the iterations of gradient search, and the
magnitude of perturbations (Figure 3). We cannot
find a proper value of fixed λ that achieves a high
success rate, small iterations, and small perturba-
tions simultaneously. For modified binary searching
of λ, as long as we conduct enough searching steps, it
can always find a proper λ to achieve a high success
rate and small perturbations. However, it takes a
much longer time, which makes adversarial examples
hardly applicable to real-time systems.
We propose an adaptive search method. Adap-
tive Attack, to generate adversarial examples. From
Equation 3, CTC loss CTCLoss(·, ·) and Euclidean
loss D(·, ·) are viewed as a classification task and a
regression task respectively. Thus generating adver-
sarial examples (Equation 3) becomes solving a multi-
task problem with two objectives.
Non-sequential Classification Tasks: We opti-
mize the adversarial images based on maximizing the
Gaussian likelihood with uncertainty:
maximize Pr(x′|x, l′). (4)
We assume that Pr(x′) and Pr(x, l′) are constant val-
ues, and x and l′ are independent variables, then
Pr(x′|x, l′) = Pr(x, l
′|x′) Pr(x′)
Pr(x, l′)
∝ Pr(x, l′|x′) = Pr(x|x′) Pr(l′|x′)
(5)
We define original input x as a random variable which
follows Gaussian distribution with mean x′ and noise
scale λ1:
Pr(x|x′) = N (x′, λ21),
log Pr(x|x′) ∝ −‖x− x
′‖22
2λ21
− log λ21.
(6)
For a classification task, we apply a classification like-
lihood to the output:
Pr(l′|x′) = Softmax(f(x′)), (7)
where f(·) denotes the output of the neural network
before softmax layer. We use a squashed version of
model output with a positive scalar λ2:
Pr(l′|x′, λ2) = Softmax(f(x
′)
λ22
),
log Pr(l′ = c|x′, λ2) = fc(x
′)
λ22
− log
∑
c′ 6=c
exp
fc′(x
′)
λ22
.
(8)
Then we define the joint loss (optimized objective) as
follows:
L = − log Pr(x, l′|x′) = − log Pr(x|x′)− log Pr(l′|x′).
(9)
According to [21], we can derive the optimization
problem (Equation 4,5) by minimizing:
L ∝ L1(x, x
′)
2λ21
+
L2(x′, l′)
λ22
+ log λ21 + log λ
2
2, (10)
where L1(x, x′) = ‖x − x′‖22 denoting the squared
Euclidean distance and L2(x, l′) denotes the cross-
entropy loss. We adaptively generate adversarial ex-
amples for non-sequential classification tasks without
manually tuning λ. In practice, we replace log λ2i with
ηi to avoid numerical instability.
Sequential Classification Tasks: Given an in-
put sequenceX, the network will output a probability
distribution over the output domain for each frame.
The probability of a given path pi can be written as:
Pr(pi|x) =
T∏
t=1
ytpit (11)
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We define B as the conditional probability of a given
labeling l. Let CTCLoss be the negative log of prob-
abilities of all the paths given l:
CTCLoss(x, l) = − log
∑
pi∈B−1(l)
Pr(pi|x). (12)
The CTCLoss of an adversarial example x′ with tar-
geted label l′ is:
CTCLoss(x
′, l′) = − log
∑
pi∈B−1(l′)
Pr(pi|x′). (13)
We consider paths with probability greater than or
equal to a small constant c: Pr(pi|x′) =∏Tt=1 ytpit ≥ c.
We first assume that only two valid paths satisfy this
constraint: pi1, pi2.
− log Pr(l′|x′) ≈ − log (Pr(pi1|x′) + Pr(pi2|x′))
≤ −1
2
(log Pr(pi1|x′) + log Pr(pi2|x′))− log 2 (Jensen’s inequality)
= −1
2
log
T∏
t=1
Pr(ytpi1t)−
1
2
log
T∏
t=1
Pr(ytpi2t)− log 2
= −1
2
T∑
t=1
(
log Pr(ytpi1t) + log Pr(y
t
pi2t
)
)− log 2
≈ 1
2
T∑
t=1
(
−A1,t
λ22
+ log λ22 −
A2,t
λ22
+ log λ22
)
− log 2 (Similar to Eq. 8)
= −
∑T
t=1A1,t +A2,t
2λ22
+ T log λ22 − log 2,
(14)
where Ai,t = logSoftmax(ytpiit , f(x
′)), i = 1, 2.
CTCLoss with two valid paths pi1, pi2 becomes:
CTCLoss ≈ − log (Pr(pi1|x′) + Pr(pi2|x′))
= − log Pr(pi1|x′)− log Pr(pi2|x′)− log Pr(pi1|x
′) + Pr(pi2|x′)
Pr(pi1|x′) Pr(pi2|x′)
≥ − log Pr(pi1|x′)− log Pr(pi2|x′)− log 2
c
.
(15)
Combining Equation 14 and 15, we have an upper
bound of − log Pr(l′|x′) and the joint loss L:
− log Pr(l′|x′) ≤ CTCLoss + log
2
c
2λ22
+ T log λ22 − log 2,
L ≤ L1(x, x
′)
2λ21
+
CTCLoss(x
′, l′)
2λ22
+ log λ21 + T log λ
2
2 +
1
λ22
− log 2.
(16)
To extend the number of valid paths from 2 to an
arbitrary number n, the joint loss L satisfies:
L ≤L1(x, x
′)
2λ21
+
CTCLoss(x
′, l′)
nλ22
+ log λ21 + T log λ
2
2
+
log n− (n− 1) log c
nλ22
.
(17)
From our observation, CTC loss always reduces
very fast (Figure 5). Thus we can use a small num-
ber of valid paths to generate adversarial examples.
From our experiments, it works well when n < 50.
We use n = 2 to report our results. Thus, we can gen-
erate sequential adversarial examples by minimizing
the upper bound of L:
L1(x, x′)
λ21
+
CTCLoss(x
′, l′)
λ22
+ log λ21 + T log λ
2
2 +
1
λ22
.
(18)
4 Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of
Adaptive Attack for the non-sequential classification
task comparing Adaptive Attack with C&W Attack.
We then focus on the performance of Adaptive Attack
for the sequential task. We attack a scene text recog-
nition model as our use case. Besides, we investigate
the generated images and the image changes during
the attack for the sequential classification task.
4.1 Non-Sequential Attack
We evaluate non-sequential attacks for the image
classification task. We use a pre-trained Inception
V3 model [33] as the victim model, which achieves
22.55% top-1 error rate and 6.44% top-5 error rate in
ImageNet recognition challenge.
We compare Adaptive Attack with C&W attack.
The original C&W attack achieves small perturba-
tions but takes more iterations (See an example in
Figure 1). To make a fair comparison, we modify
the C&W attack by applying a more strict early-stop
strategy - we stop attacking when the objective func-
tion (Equation 4) does not decrease in the past k
iterations. We will use the modified C&W attack as
6
our baseline (referred to as Basic Attack) in the pa-
per. We set early-stop k = 20 for Basic Attack and
k = 1 for Adaptive Attack, due to a more smooth
objective function in Adaptive Attack.
We evaluate Adaptive Attack on the first 2,000 im-
ages in the validation set of ImageNet. We randomly
assign a new label on an image and report success if
the attack generates an adversarial image predicted
with this label. Table 1 reports the success rate, aver-
age `2 distance of perturbation, and average attack-
ing iterations for modified C&W attack (Basic At-
tack) and Adaptive Attack. Search step denotes the
number of λ manually searched in the Basic Attack.
Our results show that Adaptive Attack reaches
small perturbations within a much less time com-
pared to Basic Attack.
4.2 Sequential Attack
We evaluate sequential attacks on a scene text recog-
nition model. We compare the performance of Basic
Attack and propose Adaptive Attack on three stan-
dard benchmarks. We then analyze the sequential
attacks on a simulated sequential MNIST dataset.
4.2.1 Basic Attack vs. Adaptive Attack
We conducted experiments on three standard bench-
marks for cropped word image recognition: the Street
View Text dataset (SVT) [35], the ICDAR 2013
dataset (IC13) [19], and the IIIT 5K-word dataset
(IIIT5K) [25]. We train an end-to-end deep learning
model using Pytorch, based on the state-of-the-art
scene text recognition approach, Convolutional Re-
current Neural Network (CRNN) [30]1.
We compare Basic Attack and Adaptive Attack on
these benchmarks. The targeted sequential label is
set as the common word with the same length as the
original one.
Figure 3 shows the performance of Basic Attack
with fixed λ values. We run gradient descent searches
for 10,000 iterations. Early stopping is adopted to
avoid unnecessary computation. We only calculate
1we refer to the implementation on github.com/bgshih/
crnn and modify the kernel size in the pooling layers for better
alignment.
Figure 3: Basic Attack with fixed λ values. We
generate adversarial examples on the IC13 dataset
using Basic Attack. None of the λ values can well
balance CTC loss (success rate curve in blue), dis-
tance (`2 distance curve in red), and optimizing time
(iteration curve in green).
distances and iterations of the successful attacks to
avoid the extremely large values when the attack fails.
The results show that when we use large λ values (1,
10, 100), it fails to generate adversarial examples in
most cases. For small λ values (0.1, 0.01), although
Basic Attack successfully generates adversarial im-
ages, it spends a much longer time and brings a larger
magnitude of perturbations.
We then compare the performance of Adaptive At-
tack and Basic Attack using a fixed λ or a modified
binary search. Table 2 lists our results. Basic0.1, Ba-
sic1, and Basic10 denote Basic Attack with fixed λ
values: 0.1, 1, and 10 respectively. BasicBinary3, Ba-
sicBinary5, BasicBinary10 denote Basic Attack with
3, 5, and 10 steps of binary searching. We set the ini-
tial λ as 0.1, which is the best λ according to the
results of fixed λ values (Figure 3).
From Table 2, we observe that both Adaptive At-
tack and Basic Attack with a modified binary search
can successfully generate adversarial examples on the
scene text recognition model. Basic Attack with fixed
λ values cannot achieve both success rate and low
distance of perturbations. Adaptive Attack conducts
attacks much faster (3 ∼ 6×) than Basic Attack with
a modified binary search. Although Basic Attack
achieves smaller perturbations than Adaptive Attack,
it is reasonable for binary search method to have a
finer tuning on the λ if the initial λ value is prop-
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Methods Search Step Success Rate Distance Iteration
Basic Attack 3 100% 1.957 199.298
Basic Attack 5 100% 0.689 342.993
Adaptive Attack 1 100% 0.517 253.088
Table 1: Performance Comparison between Basic Attack and Adaptive Attack on ImageNet
Methods IC13 SVT IIIT5KSuccess Rate Distance Iteration Success Rate Distance Iteration Success Rate Distance Iteration
Basic0.1 99.90% 3.57 1621.88 99.69% 3.59 1470.29 99% 2.90 7127.92
Basic1 88.55% 1.75 526.92 91.55% 1.67 518.99 95.39% 1.77 3606.26
Basic10 53.38% 0.44 179.75 68.23% 0.47 172.82 39.12% 0.39 1395.99
BasicBinary3 100.00% 1.64 1531.84 100.00% 1.17 1442.86 100.00% 2.01 4097.52
BasicBinary5 100.00% 1.64 1706.18 100.00% 1.15 1616.35 100.00% 1.96 5055.21
BasicBinary10 100.00% 1.58 2138.86 100.00% 1.11 1993.47 100.00% 1.94 6811.86
Adaptive 100.00% 2.15 480.28 100.00% 1.26 529.90 99.96% 2.68 682.48
Table 2: Performance Comparison between Basic Attack and Adaptive Attack on Three Scene Text Recog-
nition Benchmarks
(a) insertion
24500→ 294500
(b) insertion (repeated)
24500→ 245500
(c) substitution
24500→ 29500
(d) deletion
24500→ 2400
Figure 4: Four types of Adversarial attacks on the SeqMNIST dataset: insertion, insertion (re-
peated), substitution, and deletion. The images in the first row are the same original images. After per-
turbing (amplified by 10×, second row), we generate the adversarial images (third row), which can be
misclassified as different labels. Red lines illustrate the corresponding CTC alignments of original labels and
targeted labels. There are 25 alignment positions each representing 4 pixels in width.
erly set and the number of binary search iterations is
large enough.
4.3 Analysis of Sequential Attack
To dig into the phenomenon of sequential adversar-
ial examples, we generate adversarial examples on a
simple sequential classification task. We first simu-
late a sequential digit dataset by concatenating digit
images in the MNIST dataset and fit them into a
32x100 pixel box. The training and test sequential
digits are generated from MNIST training and test
sets. We refer to this dataset as SeqMNIST. The first
row in Figure 4 illustrates an example (‘24500’). We
then trained our model with SeqMNIST.
We analyze three types of common adversarial op-
erations on targeted sequential labels: insertion, sub-
stitution, and deletion. We perform these operations
on one digit and remain the rest unchanged. We also
include another operation which inserts a repeated
digit (e.g., ‘24500’ → ‘245500’). We perform an ad-
versarial attack on the SeqMNIST dataset and exam
100 adversarial images for each operation.
CTC alignments in the adversarial exam-
ples: We observe that most CTC alignments are sta-
ble against adversarial examples (Figure 4). When
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Figure 5: Attack Process. We demonstrate four
adversarial examples on the SeqMNIST dataset, in-
cluding insertion (‘04763’ → ‘047673’), insertion re-
peated (‘434’ → ‘4334’), substitution (‘54258’ →
‘94258’), and deletion (‘68862’ → ‘6886’). First row:
original images. Last row: adversarial images. The
middle rows: adversarial perturbations (amplified by
10×) added on the original images in the order of
iterations.
added perturbations on the images, only the CTC
alignments surrounding the targeted labels will be
changed. We investigate the following four opera-
tions. (i) Insertion: When inserting a digit into
the targeted label, we find that the added pertur-
bations usually appear in the middle of two adja-
cent digits. Sometimes, the neighboring pixels are
‘borrowed’ by the new digit that is close to one side
for self-construction, which costs smaller perturba-
tions. However, it is not the case for repeated inser-
tions. (ii) Insertion (repeated): The added per-
turbations usually appear far from the repeated digit.
For instance, the new ‘5’ is close to ‘0’ and far from
‘5’ (Figure 4). This is a more efficient and optimal
solution to attack CTC alignments. (iii) Substitu-
tion: When substituting a label, the CTC alignments
change slightly in the position of substitution. The
rest of the targeted labels remain in the same posi-
tions. (iv) Deletion: When we delete the targeted
digit, the remaining CTC alignments barely change
their positions. It also requires the least magnitude
of perturbations.
Figure 5 visualizes the attack process of a SeqM-
NIST sample. We find that CTC alignments only
change in the first few iterations and appear close
to the targeted (inserted/ substituted/ deleted) po-
sitions. After that, the adversarial attack will focus
on minimizing the magnitude of perturbations.
5 Conclusions
We proposed a novel approach to learn multi-
task weights without manually tuning the hyper-
parameters. The proposed Adaptive Attack method
substantially speeds up the process of adversarial at-
tacks for both non-sequential and sequential tasks.
We successfully attacked a popular scene text recog-
nition system with over 99.9% success rate on three
standard benchmark datasets. Our future work will
investigate i) defense mechanisms using Adaptive At-
tack, ii) defense mechanism for sequential tasks.
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